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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
AS TO FACTS 
Respondent is dissatisfied both with Appellant's 
failure to cite facts in the record which support the lower 
Court's ruling and with his argument's references to matters not 
sustained by the record. Accordingly, Respondent makes this 
statement of facts relevant to the issues presented for review 
which issues center in Appellant's claim that he should have 
been awarded one-half of the "equity interest" in the Sheridan 
Road residential real property* 
The Sheridan Road property claim was the subject of 
the following colloquy with the trial court at the outset of 
Appellant's examination of Respondent regarding that property: 
MR. PAXTON: Your Honor, I understood from what 
was reported to me by Mr. Fankhauser, as a result of the 
pretrial conference with this Courtf that the issue of who 
owned this property [Sheridan Road] or whether these two 
people involved in this casef the plaintiff and the 
defendant, indeed have any right, title or any equitable 
interest in it, vis-a-vis its titled owner, Mr. Cap Persch, 
was not an issue in this proceeding. 
MR. FANKHAUSER: That's true. Still, the Court 
can determine if there is an equity interest and then the 
Court can deal with it, is that what you're talking about? 
MR. PAXTON: The Court is not here to determine 
if in fact any equity interest exists in favor of this 
plaintiff and this defendant, vis-a-vis, the titled 
property owner. 
THE COURT: I don't understand that statement, 
Mr. Paxton. If these people have a claim in some property, 
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this Court as between these people can determine what their 
respective interest may be. As to somebody else, I make no 
determination, right? 
* * * 
MR. PAXTON: On that basis then, I understand 
that we're not here to quiet any title or grant any award 
against any other persons? 
THE COURT: I can't. 
MR. PAXTON: Exactly. Exactly, but I think the 
Court can determine, based upon any evidence, what the 
character of any asserted claim may be, whether it's joint 
marital property or pro-parties (sic) [partakes] of any 
separate property character or whatever, is that correct 
then? Do I understand the Court? 
THE COORT: As between these parties, the only 
determination I will be able to make is whether or not one 
has any preferential rights over the other if it is marital 
estate. 
(R. 228-30). 
The record facts relevant to the issues presented, including the 
issue framed by the trial court, are: 
Wendy and Terry Hermansen resided in a home at 2315 
Sheridan Road, Salt Lake City, Utah, from January 1978 until 
their separation in June 1984. (Findings of Fact 1M[6 and 11, 
Record on Appeal pagination number 113, hereinafter "R.") 
Wendy's parents, C. A. and Sharon Persch, were record owners of 
that property throughout the time of the parties' occupancy and 
at the time of trial. (R. 257, 259) Prior to their move to 
Sheridan Road the parties had resided in a house on McClelland 
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Avenue in Salt Lake City which Terry had owned before they 
married in June 1977. (R. 182, 226) At about the time they 
moved into Sheridan Road they had a discussion at the home with 
Wendy's father which resulted in their signing a document he 
drew, Defendant's Exhibit 7. (R. 254) Mr. Persch characterized 
Exhibit D-7 as an "offer to sell the property which involved a 
gift if it was performed." (R. 274, 276) Terry understood that 
the purchase offer had been made by Wendy's parents pursuant to 
their plan to gift $30,000 for tax purposes to each of their 
children toward a home. (R. 250, 253, 255-56) Mr. Persch 
testified that he discussed his intent to gift to his daughter 
and grandchildren at the time Exhibit D-7 was signed and said: 
"I wanted to see that my children and grandchildren were living 
in the best conditions possible. If I could help in any way, I 
was going to make all desire to make that happen. I did want to 
gift them as much money as I possibly could." (R. 260-62) 
Part of the gift was reflected in the difference 
between Exhibit D-7's recited $58,000 purchase price and the 
property's fair market value at that time which Mr. Persch 
testified was $70-75,000. (R. 261) He based that valuation, in 
part, upon an earlier bank loan appraisal he had obtained. (R. 
276-77) Terry testified that another gift related to the 
Sheridan Road property was made by Mr. and Mrs. Persch on 
Christmas Day 1978 by their delivery to Wendy and him of Exhibit 
D-8, a signed card acknowledging reduction of their note 
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indebtedness by four $3,000 gift amounts totalling $12,000. (R. 
250; Ex. D-8) When they had "moved in originally" Terry 
understood that gifts were going to be made in this form each 
year until they couldn't give any more for tax purposes. 
(R. 250, 255-56) Terry characterized their occupancy of 
Sheridan Road in 1978 as follows: "We were living there, 
maintaining the place and paying the bills." (R. 252) 
Whether the parties made the down payment called for 
by Exhibit D-7 was disputed: Terry claimed to have performed 
roofing labor for Mr. Persch and Wendy's brother in exchange for 
that payment (R. 286-87); Wendy testified no down payment was 
made. (R. 339) Nevertheless, Terry did not controvert Mr. 
Persch's testimony that Wendy and he had not performed the 
contract in that they had failed to assume the Valley Bank loan 
and that Terry told him he did not want to buy the house, that 
he did not have the money and he couldn't afford it and did not 
want to refinance it. (R. 274, 278) Wendy's belief that they 
had no ownership interest in the Sheridan Road property was 
based on similar reasons: No down payment or yearly payments 
had been made, and when her father discussed the refinancing of 
the Valley Bank mortgage Terry told her "he didn't want to do 
it, to make a higher monthly payment" because he couldn't afford 
it. (R. 339, 341) The purchase offer required that the mortgage 
loan be assumed, not just that the monthly loan payments be 
made, in order that Mr. Persch "could get off the line" for the 
loan. (R. 274) 
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During the time the parties occupied the Sheridan Road 
home they paid the monthly $328 mortgage loan payments to Valley 
Bank. Those payments came from two sources: $258/mo. from 
their current earnings, and $70/mo. from proceeds Wendy received 
from property she owned before the marriage. (R. 230-31, 240, 
2429 246f 272) They also paid the property taxes and insurance 
becausef as Wendy testified/ "The rent would have been 
substantially higher if we didn't do that." (R. 232) Howeverf 
the year before their separation/ 1983, and again in 1984 they 
failed to pay the property taxes. (R. 219-20) 
Terry testified that when they moved into Sheridan 
Road the yard was overgrown with a lot of garbage in the garage 
and in the back which he cleaned upf hauled away and 
relandscaped. (R. 155-56) His description of the interior and 
exterior condition of the home was: "Living room was in fairly 
good condition. That was about it." (R. 156) In 1982 the 
parties completed numerous remodeling projects with Terry 
performing most of the labor. Terry testified the cost of the 
remodeling materials was "close to $25-30/000" and was paid by 
billing them to Mr. Persch's company/ Furniture Distribution 
Center ("P.D.C."). (R.291-94) Terry offered no evidence 
regarding either the increase in Sheridan Road's market valuef 
if any/ attributable to that remodeling or the value of his 
labor. 
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It was through F.D.C. and an affiliated Utah 
corporation. Desk & Chairs, Inc.f which had been organized and 
funded by Mr. Persch and F.D.C. for Terry's sole ownership and 
operation, that he realized his income which increased from 
$25,000 in 1980 to $34,400 in 1983. (Ex. 1-P) Wendy worked in 
the Desk & Chairs business as well earning $4,000 in 1983 (Ex. 
P-l) At the time of trial Desk & Chairs was defunct but she 
continued to be employed at F.D.C. (R. 185, 271) The $4,600 
vested pension plan funds awarded to Terry (Memorandum Decision 
1fll, R. 99) were the sole remnant of that defunct corporation. 
Terry acknowledged that it was either from F.D.C. via 
company trades, non-cash bonuses or paycheck deductions or from 
Mr. and Mrs. Persch via gifts that the parties obtained the 
furniture and personal property items acquired during the 
marriage which are identified in his Exhibit D-9. (R. 292, 
328-336) 
Considering all this Mr. Persch testified "We've given 
them countless thousands." (R. 262) 
The parties brought certain items of personal property 
into the marriage. Those which remained at the time of trial 
were acknowledged to remain the property of each. (Findings of 
Fact 1(14, R. 114; Decree of Divorce 1[11, R. 124) 
Terry sold his McClelland property during the marriage 
realizing $12,000. (R. 311) $4,000 of that sum was used as the 
down payment to purchase the 1979 Dodge Ramcharger awarded to 
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Wendy. (R. 311) Mr. and Mrs. Persch had paid off the $1/200 
balance of the original lien against the vehicle in 1981. 
(R. 240, 319) Howeverf the parties later took out another loan 
against it to pay family debts the unpaid balance of which was 
$1/700. when they separated. By the time of trial Wendy had 
paid that loan balance down to $862. (R. 218-19/ 240) An expert 
witness called by Wendy testified that in his opinion the 
Ramcharger's market value was $2/000. (R. 146) Terry's opinion 
testimony of the value of the truck was not received. 
(R. 305-306) The court found its value to be as the expert 
testified. (Findings of Fact H13f R. 113) 
McClelland proceeds were also used to pay Sheridan 
Road property taxes (R. 311) , and for Terry's $3f000 share in a 
ten-acre real property investment with Mr. Persch and Wendy's 
brother called the "Bitner" property. (R. 322-23/ 325) Wendy 
testified she understood the Bitner investment was a family deal 
which included her brother's wife and her. (R. 338) Neither 
party offered any valuation evidence for the Bitner property. 
(R. 200/ 321-22) 
Terry's Exhibit D-9 contains valuation figures for the 
Sheridan Road ($110/000) and Bitner ($20/000) properties/ as 
well as a Bitner indebtedness ($2r667) , which are used in his 
brief as the foundation for his analysis and argument that the 
Court's property distribution is inequitable. (Appellant's Brief 
pp. 9/ 11 and 13) However/ Exhibit D-9 was received solely for 
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the purpose of "...what he would claim to be his feelings as to 
distribution" (R. 301) and not as evidence of the matters it 
contains. None of those figures is property argued to the Court 
for these reasonss Upon counsel's timely objection the Court 
ordered Terry's testimony regarding that Sheridan Road value 
estimate stricken (R. 301); the only evidence related to the 
Bitner property's value was its $18,500 acquisition price but 
the purchase date was not established (R. 325); andf the Bitner 
indebtedness figure was taken from Mr. Persch's unpublished 
deposition. (Appellant's Brief p. 9) 
With the single exception of the claimed Sheridan Road 
"gross equity" which Terry proposed be divided equally, the 
Court distributed all of the properties before it in exactly the 
manner suggested in his Exhibit D-9, "Defendant's Proposed 
Property Settlement" (Memorandum Decision 116-11r R.99) . 
Similarly/ the Court ordered the parties to pay and discharge 
their obligations/ including the liens on the vehicles awarded 
to eachf in the manner proposed in Terry's Exhibit D-10, 
"Schedule of Debts and Obligations" (Memorandum Decision 112, 
R. 100) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Respondent submits that Appellant's failure to request 
the trial court to amend its findings to correct the 
insufficiencies which he argues as the basis for the relief he 
seeks here constitutes a waiver of those claims. 
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Respondent also submits that the trial court's failure 
to find that any interest in the Sheridan Road property or the 
interest acquired by Appellant in the Bitner property were 
marital estate is supported by the evidence and that its award 
of "any and all" interests in those properties to each party, 
respectively, is in harmony with this Court's rulings in which 
it is acknowledged that restoration of separate property 
contributions to parties in divorce actions is proper. 
Respondent submits that Appellant's claim of error as 
a result of the trial court's failure to establish a valuation 
for the Sheridan Road property is without merit where the court 
did not first find that the property was marital estate andf 
therefore, subject to distribution. Lastly, Respondent argues 
that the Court's division of the property items it found to be 
subject to distribution cannot be shown to be so inequitable as 
to be the result of an abuse of discretion. 
ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANT'S CLAIM HAS 
BEEN WAIVED 
Appellant cites Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1772 (Utah 
1985) , as authority for the relief he seeks. Respondent 
suggests that the Jones decision cuts against him. 
In Jones this Court ruled that the appellant-wife's 
contention that the case should be remanded for entry of 
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findings as to property values in order that the equitability of 
the decreed property distribution could be assessed had been 
waived for the reason that her counsel had made no motion to the 
trial court to amend its findings to include specific property 
values. 
At the trial of this action the Court stated that its 
consideration of evidence relevant to Terry's claim that the 
parties owned an "equity interest" in the Sheridan Road property 
would be for the purpose of determining whether either party had 
preferential rights over the other if such claim was found to be 
marital estate. (R. 230) 
The trial court did not find that any such claim was 
marital estate. (Findings of Fact 1(11 and Conclusions of Law 1f7, 
R. 113, 116), and Appellant's post-trial motion for a new trial 
or amendment of judgment did not request that any new or 
additional findings be made in that regard. Nevertheless, he 
now claims this is an insufficiency in the findings which 
results in error in the Court's property award. (Appellant's 
Brief p. 5, para. 1 and p. 10, para. 2) The trial court had 
correctly indicated to counsel that a finding that any claimed 
interest in the Sheridan Road property was marital estate would 
have to be made before it could consider what the parties' 
rights in that property should be. In the absence of such a 
finding the trial court's award of any such interest to Wendy is 
entitled the presumption that it is correct and 
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supported by the evidence and Terry's failure to request the 
trial court to make an express finding on that issue precludes 
him from claiming that insufficiency as error now. The Jones 
"waiver" holding is directly on point. 
Neither did Appellant's post-trial motion specifically 
request the Court to open the judgment and take further evidence 
in order to value the Sheridan Road property. Rather, it merely 
challenged the Court's ruling on the admissibility of Terry's 
valuation testimony (R. 301) and objected to the Court's refusal 
to award him what he wanted on the Sheridan Road property as an 
abuse of discretion. 
And last, in his post-trial motion Terry did not 
request the Court to make a finding as to whether the Bitner 
property interest awarded to him was marital estate or to 
establish its valuation for the purpose of assessing the merit 
of his motion. Because the equitability of a property 
distribution order can only be weighed by viewing all of its 
provisions as a wholef Appellant's failure to request the lower 
court to correct all parts of its order susceptible to the same 
objections which he now raises in connection with only some 
parts should preclude him from obtaining the Court's review of 
that order. 
Accordingly, this Court should rule that Appellant has 
waived any claim to the relief he seeks. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT"S FAILURE TO FIND 
ANY CLAIM IN THE SHERIDAN ROAD 
PROPERTY TO BE MARITAL ESTATE IS 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Appellant premises his arguments to this Court on the 
assumptions that the parties had an "equitable interest" in the 
Sheridan Road property and that this interest was marital 
estate. Howeverf the trial court made no findings regarding 
either of those assumptions which is supported by the evidence. 
The first point to be made is that the parties had no 
interest whatever in the Sheridan Road property. According to 
the testimony of Mr. Persch the parties failed to perform the 
terms of Exhibit D-7 which he described as an offer to purchase 
"involving a gift if it was performed." (R. 274, 276) The best 
position the parties ever occupied under Exhibit D-7 was a 
chance to own the property if they complied with its terms. 
Terry did not controvert Mr. Persch's testimony that he had 
refused to assume the Valley Bank loan when his father-in-law 
requested him to do so saying that didn't want to buy the house 
because he couldn't afford it. (R. 274, 278) The trial judge 
could choose to believe Mr. Persch—which he apparently did—and 
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this Court should not substitute its view of the evidence for 
that of the fact finder who alone can assess demeanor and 
credibility. The court's failure to find any marital-estate 
interest in the the Sheridan Road property is supported by 
substantial record evidence and its conclusions should notf 
therefore, be disturbed. 
Assuming, however, that the Court found some interest 
in the Sheridan Road property had been acquired during the 
marriage it was, nevertheless, proper under the evidence for the 
Court to not find that interest to be marital estate and to set 
any such interest over to Wendy. 
The case of Larrabee v. Larrabee, 504 P.2d 358 (Colo. 
Ct. Ap. 1972) is persuasive authority for this position. In 
Larrabee the wife had been gifted three parcels of property: 
one by her grandfather prior to the marriage and two by her 
mother during the marriage. The mother's gifts were made to the 
wife, her brother and their spouses. The gifts were made to 
reduce the mother's estate and were motivated by tax 
considerations. Upon delivery of the deeds the grantees had 
executed secured promissory notes payable in yearly 
installments. As each installment came due it was forgiven. 
The notes remained unpaid at the time of trial. The court 
divided the parties' personal properties between them and 
awarded "all of their interests in the real property" to the 
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wife* Upon the husband's appeal of that real property award the 
court found and held: 
In determining the proper 
division of property in a divorce 
action many factors must be 
considered^ including how the property 
was acquired, the financial situation 
of the parties, their participation in 
enhancing and preserving its value, 
and all other pertinent circumstances, 
[citations omitted] The husband was 
on active duty as a petty officer in 
the navy during the five year duration 
of the marriage. The court found that 
his participation, if any, in the 
management of the land given to the 
wife prior to the marriage was 
adequately compensated by the income 
received therefrom. The court further 
found that the gift from the wife's 
mother was intended primarily as a 
gift to her own children and that the 
husband was not entitled to retain any 
interest in the land. Under the ' 
circumstances of this case, the award 
of the property to the wife, based on 
these findings was not an abuse of 
discretion. 
504 P.2d at 359-60. 
Also close on point is the case cited in the Larrabee 
opinion, Cohan v. Cohan, 474 P.2d 792 (Colo. 1970). The wife's 
principal contention on appeal was that the Court had erred in 
finding that money given to her by the husband's parents was a 
gift to him rather than to her. Before the marriage the 
husband's father had drawn two checks payable to her for $6,000 
and $5,000 specifying that the proceeds were to be applied 
toward a house for the parties. She endorsed the checks, gave 
them back to her husband and the proceeds were applied in 
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acquiring a home* The husband's father testified that he made 
the checks payable to her on his accountant's advice for gift 
tax purposes. In its attempt to restore the wife substantially 
to the same asset position she had occupied prior to the 
marriage the Court found 
[T]hat this was a gift by the 
defendant's parents to the defendant 
and that the plaintiff was not 
entitled to any portion of the $11,000 
in the property division. The 
testimony was in conflictf but there 
was ample evidence to support the 
finding of the trial court as to the 
intent with respect to the gifts, and 
we should not and will not disturb 
that finding. 
474 P.2d at 793. 
The facts of our case are analogous to those of 
Larrabee and Cohan. 
There was substantial evidence before the trial court 
which could support a finding that Wendy's parents intended to 
gift the Sheridan Road property to their daughter and their 
grandchildren. Property coming from a spouse's family in this 
way could properly be viewed as separate in character. The 
trial court's award to Terry of all interest in the Bitner 
property can be justified by a similar view of the credible 
evidencef namelyf recognition of the separate character of an 
asset acquired during the marriage with his pre-marital funds. 
As to Terry's claim of joint contributions to the 
Sheridan Road propertyf his payment of property taxes out of his 
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McClelland sales proceeds would have totalled approximately 
$5,400 for the years 1978 to 1983 (average taxes per/year = 
$900; Ex. P-l) which was less than Wendy's $70 per month 
contribution from her pre-marital funds to each house payment 
during the six and one-half years they lived there (84 mos. x 
$70 = $5f880). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the Court's findings, the balance of each monthly payment 
they made, $258, could be seen as no more than the use value of 
the property given Wendy's testimony that they would have been 
required to pay more rent than that if they had not also paid 
the property taxes and insurance* (R. 232) Terry's claim to 
have performed labor in exchange for the down payment was 
disputed (R. 286-87 and 339) It was not disputed, however, that 
the materials that went into the 1982 remodeling were paid for 
by Mr. Persch's company. (R. 291-94) 
As shown by the following summary of evidence 
supporting the Court's ruling, Wendy's personal and family-gift 
contributions to the acquisition and use of the Sheridan Road 
property outweighed Terry's by an approximate 8:1 margin: 
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TERRY WENDY 
$3f000 labor down payment 
(disputed) 
5,400 property taxes paid 
pre-marital funds 
( ? ) labor on property 
$17,000 Persch family gift on 
acquisition 
12,000 additional Persch family 
gift 
5,880 contributions to house 
payments, pre-marital 
funds 
( ? ) labor on property 
30,000 remodeling materials 
paid by Persch business 
$8,400 $64,880 
The foregoing facts adequately support the Court's 
failure to find any interest in Sheridan Road to be marital 
estate. 
Indeed, the Court's award of all Bitner property 
interest to Terry and any Sheridan Road property interest to 
Wendy is supportable under the evidence as a recognition of the 
separate-property character of the fund (Terry's McClelland sale 
proceeds) or source (Wendy's family gifts) which made each 
acquisition possible. As such the Court's property award is in 
harmony with this Court's rulings in cases such as Preston v. 
Preston, 646 P.2d 705 (Utah 1982) and Jesperson v. Jesperson, 
610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980). 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO 
VALUE THE SHERIDAN ROAD PROPERTY 
WAS NOT ERROR. 
In Larrabeef supra, the appellant-husband also argued 
that the court had abused its discretion by awarding the real 
property to the wife without first determining its value. The 
court rejected that argument stating: 
[Blefore value becomes important the 
court must first determine whether the 
property is subject to division. 
504 p.2d at 360. 
This Court's ruling in Jackman v. Jackman 696 P.2d 
1191 (Utah 1985) is similar. In that case a husband was found 
to have no interest in businesses that the appellant-wife had 
attempted to prove he owned when the suit was initiated. The 
Court's exclusion from the property distribution of the value of 
his alleged interests in those business entities and the Court's 
award to her of any interest he "has or may have had" in those 
entities was held not to be an abuse of discretion. 
In this case the court below did not find that any 
interest or equity the parties may have acquired in the Sheridan 
Road property was marital estate subject to distribution. 
Accordingly, its failure to establish a valuation for that 
property was not an abuse of discretion. 
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IV. THE COURT'S PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION 
IS EQUITABLE. 
There is no fixed rule or formula for distribution of 
a marital estate and the standard applied by this Court in 
reviewing such awards is straightforward: Was the distribution 
either the result of a misapplication of law or was it so 
inequitable as to indicate a clear abuse of discretion. Turner 
v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6 (Utah 1982). 
The trial court did not find that the parties had 
acquired any marital-estate interest in the Sheridan Road 
property. The Bitner property interest was found to have been 
obtained by Terry and Wendy's brother. (Findings of Fact 1(12f 
R. 113) As for those properties the Court specifically found 
were acquired during the marriage by the parties' it established 
dollar valuations. (Findings of Fact 1113, R. 113) Its division 
of those properties, summarized belowf although resulting in a 
dollar-value split favoring Terry cannot be said to be 
inequitable. * 
TO TERRY TO WENDY 
1981 Ford pickup $ -0- 1979 Ramcharger $1,132 
Furniture, etc. 2,170 Furniture, etc. 4,615 
Desk & Chairs 4,600 
vested pension 
funds 
$6,770 $5,747 
* (Values: Findings of Fact H13, R. 113; Exhibit D-9, 
Schedule of Furniture and Personal Property.) 
Terry's final argument that he leaves the marriage 
having unfairly lost his pre-marital separate property (the 
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McClelland sales proceeds) is also without merit when the 
evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the Court's 
findings and ruling: the $5,400 he spent for property taxes was 
more than matched by Wendy's $5,800 separate property 
contribution to the monthly house payments; his $3,000 Bitner 
investment remains intact; and his $4,000 contribution to the 
acquisition of the Ramcharger would have been offset by Wendy's 
parents' payment of the $1,200 purchase money lien balance and 
her discharge of the subsequent lien against that vehicle which 
secured a loan used to pay family debts. 
CONCLUSION 
Substantial record evidence exists which supports the 
trial court's findings and order. Appellant has not 
demonstrated that the property award was the result of a 
misapplication of law. Neither has he shown that the Court's 
distribution of the properties before it works such a manifest 
inequity as to indicate a clear abuse of discretion. 
Accordingly, the order of the trial court should be affirmed. 
^ — — - , . . ^ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this VQ 
day^bf December 1985 
A...- X 
GARY L. PAXTOff 
Clyde & Pratt 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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